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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MORRIS W. TOLD and ELAINE 
TOLD, 
Petitioners and 
Appellants, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY BOARD OF 
ADJUSTMENTS, 
Respondent. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the District 
Court's Summary Judgment Decision (which affirmed the decision of 
the Salt Lake City Board of Adjustment) when the District Court 
considered improper evidence. More specifically, if an applicant 
for a zoning variance produces evidence before the Board of 
Adjustment showing numerous instances of zoning violations by 
surrounding neighbors in an effort to support a claim of 
discrimination and estoppel, can the City's subsequent enforcement 
actions against these neighbors be properly considered by the 
District Court in ruling as to the applicant's initial claim? 
CITATION OF COURT OF APPEALS DECISION 
The decision of the Court of Appeals was made pursuant to 
Rule 31 and was affirmed without opinion on February 24, 1989. 
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Supreme Court No. 
(Priority Category 130 
JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS 
The decision of the Court of Appeals was rendered February 
24, 1989. An extension of time to file the Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari was granted on March 23, 1989 by Justice Howe for a 
thirty day period. An additional extension was subsequently 
granted until May 1, 1989. 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 
The decision of the Salt Lake City Board of Adjustment was 
made pursuant to Section 10-9-12 U.C.A. The decision of the 
District Court relating to judicial review of the Board's decision 
was made pursuant to Section 10-9-15 U.C.A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case and Course of 
Proceedings Below. 
This is an action involving a request for a zoning variance 
as to a carport built on Petitioners1 property. The matter was 
first submitted to the Board of Adjustment and the request for a 
variance as to the carport was denied on March 16, 1987. 
Subsequently, Petitioners retained counsel and a new application 
for a variance was made. On May 26, 1987 after Petitioners 
submitted a list of 38 instances of similar violations in their 
immediate neighborhood the Board of Adjustment again denied the 
variance. 
On June 15, 1987 Petitioners filed a "Petition for Relief of 
the Board of Adjustment Order" in the Third Judicial District 
Court. On January 11, 1988 the Honorable Richard Moffat executed 
an order granting defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
finding that the actions of the Board of Adjustment were proper. 
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An appeal was taken to the Utah Court of Appeals + . . ^ 
pursuant to it;s P'UIH "U affirmed the decision, w; r • • opinion r. 
If" e b r n a t: y J 'I , 1, 'Li M" I '" I Il m *" | J I <" is -" 111, !•'" e 1 i ! i 11 II; i I i " s 
based upon lihese proceedings. A copy of the Boar: ->r Adjustment 
hearing, i 11 #.-> Compl "? i nt of Petitioners in the District Court, the 
Findings and Decision of the lower court, and the decision oi the 
Court of Appeals are attached herein as an appendix. 
"" I • • on tention of Petitioner that the only facts which 
are r •> -^ «*? -*••* *-** *••**• ---nlntinn nt this rase W P T ^ developed 
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essence, the findings oil the lower coin, L are almost exclusively 
taken from that affidavit, N Affidavit of Merrill In Nelson is 
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Laird Avenue in Salt Lake City, Uta •><„ -mi i uucvi the previous 
garage and also flooded their basement Because ' -andalism in 
I., 11 e 11 e i g 111 H n 11 < K H j Iln / I! I •" I Y *" "r,JI" I": "Q "° P 
their automobiles secured, (Heari T- . : *-tempted to 
rebuild the garage on the foundation vi id one buf i *• fell 
apart and was necessary to make a new f -,„;_«;. ion and tooting. Tho 
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carport was built in order to keep the driveway free of snow and 
rain and to reduce the possibility of flooding to the house. 
(Hearing II). No building permit was obtained for either the 
carport or the garage. 
Subsequently, the Tolds applied for a permit to construct an 
addition to the back of their residence. When applying for this 
permit they did not show the existence of the garage or the 
carport located in the backyard. The permit was granted based 
upon the plans as presented. (Hearing II). 
The carport and garage is approximately one foot away from 
the east property line of the residence. This space requirement 
does not conform to the ordinances. The west side does contain 
adequate space. 
During the first hearing it was noted in the minutes that 
"Mrs. Told explained that there are several residences around 
their home which have similar situations to theirs with a garage 
and a carport." The Board also noted "Mr. Told expressed his 
feelings that the garage is in keeping with the rest of the 
neighborhood because there are several other homes with garages 
with attached carports similar to theirs." (Hearing I). 
In the second hearing the Tolds presented to the Board 
pictures and evidence that within a three-block radius there were 
38 instances of similar alleged violations of carports and 
garages. Mr. Told's attorney presented pictures and addresses 
showing the homes in violation. (Hearing II). 
At the conclusion of the first hearing the Board made the 
following order: 
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11 i s the re £o r e o rdere d that the r equ e st e d 
variance be denied. However, it is also ordered that a 
variance to allow the detached garage in the rear yard 
four feet (eave to eave) to the rear of the addition 
and closer than 15 feet to the neighbor's dwelling and 
that the carport be removed within 30 days of the 
dating of these findings and order. (Hearing I). 
, i I i i . id i Hij . i f f i nn \J '" l'i i I . I B e a t I. .u j . 
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granted in either instance. 
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illegal structures within ninety days while two are on 
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ordinance should bu amenue'.; to take nil u consideration the length 
of time for which the illegal condition had existed and the 
innocent nature of the violation by the owner of the property. Of 
the owners of the three properties which did not bother to apply 
for a variance these were supposedly turned over to the City 
Prosecutor for future legal action. (Affidavit). 
It should also be noted that Mr. and Mrs. Told each filed an 
affidavit stating that Mark Hasey, an employee of the Salt Lake 
City Board of Adjustment, had contacted some of these neighbors 
which were contained on the list of similar violations and 
informed these individuals that Mr. Told had given the City a list 
of violators. (The Affidavit of Morris Told is also attached to 
the appendix herein). 
ARGUMENT FOR ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT 
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS INCORRECTLY DECIDED AN 
IMPORTANT QUESTION OF MUNICIPAL ZONING LAW BY 
ALLOWING EVIDENCE OF SUBSEQUENT ENFORCEMENT TO 
BE CONSIDERED IN A CLAIM OF DISCRIMINATORY 
ZONING. 
This Petition reaches this Court on an appeal from an 
administrative decision of the Salt Lake City Board of Adjustment. 
The power of the District Court to review this decision is given 
pursuant to Section 10-9-15 which states: 
The City or any person aggrieved by any decision 
of the Board of Adjustment may have and maintain a 
plenary action for relief therefrom in any court of 
competent jurisdiction. 
This Court in Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake 
City, 685 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1984) stated that a district court must 
review the Board of Adjustment's decision to determine whether the 
action taken is unreasonable or is arbitrary and capricious and 
that it must rely upon the record below but can supplement such 
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record with additional evidence which is "relevant to the issues 
that were raised and considered by the Board," Id. at 1035. 
Thus, under this standard the scope of the District Court's 
decision was to determine whether or not the Board of Adjustment 
acted reasonably based upon the information which it had available 
to it at the time of its decision. While a district court can 
delve into facts which occurred during the adminstrative hearings, 
Davis County v. Clearfield City, 82 Utah Adv. Rpt. 8 (Utah 
App. 1988), the District Court cannot properly consider evidence 
which is subsequent to the administrative hearing process. 
It will be noted that the order of the District Court is 
nearly identical to the Affidavit of Merrill L. Nelson filed by 
the City in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. The Order 
and Affidavit contain three factual elements which were not 
brought before the Board of Adjustment: first, that the City's 
zoning enforcement department becomes aware of zoning violations 
in three ways (a) where plans are submitted; (b) where neighbors 
complain and (c) occasionally by a zoning inspector viewing a 
construction activity not in compliance with zoning; (Affidavit, 
para. 4; Summary Judgment Order, para. 3), second, that: 
The City's resources are not sufficient to hire 
enough building inspectors to catch every violation 
before it is completed, and thus, the City relies 
heavily on being informed of violations by citizens. 
This is especially true where the illegal construction 
is done without a permit. (Affidavit, para. 5; 
Summary Judgment Order, para. 4). 
The third factual element is the disposition and analysis of 
the some forty claimed violations of neighboring residences of the 
petitioners. All of these investigations occurred after the Board 
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of Adjustment had made its ruling that the variance to Petitioners 
be denied. 
The consideration by the lower court and the subsequent 
affirmance by the Court of Appeals of these extraneous factors 
constitutes reversible error. More importantly, however, this 
Court should clarify the scope of evidence that can be reviewed by 
a district court in administrative actions involving zoning 
disputes. This is especially true in claims of discriminatory 
practices. 
The decision of the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
flies against all administrative procedures and rules of evidence. 
This flagrant violation can be seen by the following analysis. 
It is fundamental that a city cannot intentionally, 
deliberately or systematically discriminate against an individual 
or class of individuals by wrongfully applying zoning ordinances. 
Village of Columbiana v. Keister, 449 N.E.2d 465 (Ohio 
App. 1981). As stated by one court: 
An intentional or deliberate decision by public 
officials, acting as agents of the state, not to 
enforce penal regulations against a class of violators 
expressly included within the terms of such penal 
regulation does, in our view, under the principles of 
Wick Wo [vs. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)3 constitute a 
denial of the constitutional guarantee of equal 
protection of the laws. State v. Vadnais, 202 N.W.2d 
657 (Minn. 1972). 
Likewise, this Court in Salt Lake County v. Kartchner, 
552 P.2d 136 (Utah 1976) has held that discriminatory enforcement 
by a city is a sufficient ground to deny a city equitable relief 
against the property owner. In that case, Salt Lake City 
attempted to remove a carport built in violation of set-back 
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zoning ordinances very much like the instant case. This Court 
held that the existence of six similar violations of set-back 
zoning ordinances within the vicinity of the carport erected in 
violation of the ordinance showed that the ordinance was being 
enforced in a discriminatory manner and therefore constituted 
sufficient ground for denial of a mandatory injunction against the 
carport. 
In the instant case, Petitioners relied upon Kartchner and 
other cases involving discriminatory practices to assert that it 
was both inequitable and within the power of the Board to grant a 
variance when such discriminatory practices occur. The Board of 
Adjustment took no action itself to investigate these claims 
either in the first hearing or in the second. Instead, it denied 
the variances with no investigation as to the claims made by 
Petitioners. It was only after this lawsuit was filed and the 
City could see that the petitioners were relying upon these other 
instances that the enforcement investigation began. 
If the time for determining zoning discrimination is allowed 
to occur after the administrative hearing then the whole purpose 
of discrimination claims has been effectively eliminated. If, for 
example, a homeowner is able to show at an administrative hearing 
that ten of his neighbors have not been prosecuted for the 
identical conduct under the principles mentioned above he should 
be entitled to some relief from enforcement. However, if the City 
after the administrative hearing is over can go out and merely 
begin prosecuting all ten of the neighbors when it would not have 
done so but for the hearing then the claim of discrimination 
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becomes a facade. 
Using this same reasoning a landlord who is charged with 
discrimination against a black couple can eliminate all liability 
by merely renting to several black couples after a charge has been 
levied against him. At that point in time a plaintiff could not 
prove that racial discrimination has occurred. Obviously, such an 
approach is absurd and would allow a landlord, employer, or, in 
this case, a city to correct previous discriminatory practices 
after an action has been commenced. 
Rule 407 of the Utah Rules of Evidence does not permit 
evidence of subsequent measures taken to correct defective 
conditions. This same theory is applicable to the instant case 
and should not allow the City to file a self-serving affidavit 
which goes well beyond any information which was before the Board 
of Adjustment at the time of the hearing. 
The Board of Adjustment made its decision with absolutely no 
investigation of the other properties listed by Petitioners. It 
effectively assumed that it did not matter whether there were 
forty or a thousand other similar violations in the surrounding 
area and concluded that Petitioners in all events would not be 
given a variance. Petitioners submit that this type of reasoning 
is both arbitrary and capricious and that at the least the Board 
of Adjustment should have taken the opportunity to investigate 
these claims to determine if discriminatory enforcement was 
occurring. It did not do so and it is therefore improper for the 
District Court to consider subsequent information as to these 
properties and the inspection practices of Salt Lake City which 
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was not before the Board of Adjustment. For these reasons, 
therefore, this Court should grant certiorari to correct this 
erroneous procedure which has occurred in the administrative and 
judicial proceedings below. 
In the alternative, if subsequent enforcement action is 
deemed relevant in a judicial determination of an administrative 
body's decision then an evidentiary hearing should have been 
ordered rather than allowing the matter to be decided on summary 
judgment. In this case both parties filed cross motions for 
summary judgment. However, this did not preclude a factual 
inquiry by the court. As noted by this Court: 
Cross motions for summary judgment do not ipso 
facto dissipate factual issues, even though both 
parties contend for the purposes of their motions that 
they are entitled to prevail because there are no 
material issues of fact. AmJacs Interwest, Inc. v. 
Design Associates, 635 P.2d 53, 55 (Utah 1981). 
The federal appeals court has explained this principle as 
follows: 
This is so because by the filing of a motion a 
party conceives that no issue of fact exists under the 
theory he is advancing, but he does not thereby so 
concede that no issues remain in the event his 
adversary's theory is adopted. Nafco Oil and Gas, 
Inc. v. Appleman, 380 F.2d 323, 325 (10th Cir. 1967). 
In the three prior cases interpreting decision of boards of 
adjustment none were decided on motions for summary judgment. 
See, Salt Lake County v. Kartchner, 552 P.2d 136 (Utah 1976); 
Provo City v. Hansen, 585 P.2d 461 (Utah 1978); Xanthos v. Board 
of Adjustment of Salt Lake City, 685 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1984). In a 
claim of discriminatory zoning it is proper to determine what 
actions a city has actually undertaken. At such a hearing it can 
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be determined with cross examination the ways in which zoning 
enforcement usually occurs and, in addition, it can be determined 
if indeed a cityfs resources are sufficient to find violations of 
zoning ordinances. Otherwise, any city in any lawsuit could 
always make a claim such as made by Mr. Nelson in his affidavit 
thereby precluding any further inquiry as to discriminatory 
practices. 
Likewise, whether the forty property owners who were on the 
list given to the City by the petitioners actually are in 
violation of city ordinances should be examined by both parties 
rather than allowing the City to arbitrarily conclude which ones 
are in violation and which ones are not. It may well be, for 
example, that there are many more violations of the City 
ordinances than that claimed by Mr. Nelson in his affidavit. 
Since no evidence was taken as to these other claims and no 
opportunity was given to even cross examine Mr. Nelson as to his 
statements, the self-serving statements rubber-stamped by the 
District Court of the City's position are invalid and can carry no 
evidentiary weight. Thus, alternatively, this Court should accept 
certiorari for the purpose again of defining what scope of 
evidentiary hearing is required in discriminatory zoning cases to 
prevent this type of unfair judicial proceeding. 
A third and final reason exists for reviewing the decision of 
the Court of Appeals and the District Court. If the City in a 
case involving zoning discrimination is allowed to bring charges 
against the other property owners listed by the petition such 
action effectively forecloses a petitioner from asserting a valid 
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defense because of the economic and social repercussions which 
will occur in his own neighborhood. Here, for example, it was 
necessary to obtain a restraining order against the City from 
informing the various persons listed by the petitioners that the 
investigation of the properties was being undertaken because of 
Petitioners1 efforts. In effect, to allow this type of conduct to 
occur forces a petitioner in a zoning dispute to choose between 
asserting his rights of unlawful discrimination and keeping peace 
within his neighborhood. Certainly, if a city has not enforced a 
zoning regulation for years in a certain area it should be 
equitably estopped to enforce it against both the 
petitioner and those whom he lists. 
Under this procedure approved by the lower court it would 
only be necessary for a city official to cite one homeowner for a 
zoning violation. At that point the homeowner could be asked to 
supply the city with a list of other claimed violators. The city 
could then approach each of these individuals and ask for further 
lists of violations. Soon, the city could be supplied with 
hundreds of alleged violations supplied by homeowners eager to 
escape sanctions not knowing that not only will they in fact 
receive sanctions but will also make sure that their neighbors and 
friends will also receive such sanctions. This system could 
undoubtedly save a city thousands of dollars a year since it would 
not need to hire patrolling building inspectors to look for 
violations but would only have to go to the residences previously 
investigated by other homeowners. 
Such a system can hardly be condoned in a democracy. If a 
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city is unable to properly police its own zoning regulations when 
such regulations are easily visible to untrained property owners a 
major shakeup in the city's administrative enforcement officers 
should obviously occur. 
This Court, therefore, should grant certiorari to review this 
type of practice which Petitioners claim is unreasonable and goes 
against the very heart of a harmonious community and 
neighborhood. 
CONCLUSION 
Although this case only involves a carport and a garage it is 
nevertheless worthy of review by this Court. In the past, this 
Court has prevented inequitable zoning discriminations from 
occurring in matters which are equally austere. If administrative 
bodies throughout the State of Utah are to be given credibility to 
pass upon important property rights then it is essential 
that these bodies properly hear and determine the claims of 
property owners. 
Here, it is apparent that the Board of Adjustment in both 
hearings paid no attention to the claims of Petitioners that they 
had been misled into building their structures by the presence of 
numerous such structures within the surrounding neighborhood. 
Instead, the Board of Adjustment merely looked strictly at the 
zoning ordinances and denied Petitioners1 claim for a variance. 
In doing so, they refused to consider legitimate claims which have 
been recognized by federal and state courts as defenses and 
justification for variances in zoning matters. 
The District Court considered improper post-hearing evidence 
-14-
submitted by the City for the sole purpose of eliminating these 
claims. If discrimination had occurred the point in time of 
relevancy was before the hearing and not after it. The City 
should not be allowed to eliminate equitable defenses by merely 
prosecuting everybody which for years it has refrained from doing. 
This type of conduct would never be permitted in any other 
category of discrimination cases either Federal or state. This 
type of conduct essentially tells a wrongdoer that discrimination 
is all right as long as the discriminatory practice is stopped as 
soon as a violation has been alleged. Obviously, social and legal 
policies strongly oppose such a contorted approach. 
In addition, even if it is assumed arguendo that 
post-hearing events are relevant the petitioners are entitled to 
an evidentiary hearing rather than having the matter disposed on 
summary judgment. This procedure again allows a city to 
arbitrarily file a self-serving affidavit either denying any 
discrimination has occurred with other property owners or showing 
that such discrimination has been eliminated by vigorous 
enforcement. It is impossible, however, for a district court to 
know whether these claims are in fact true without the protections 
of cross examination and discovery which an evidentiary hearing 
would permit. 
Finally, if a city can utilize a list of names given to is by 
a person accused of zoning violations, such use will have a 
significant chilling effect upon any future claims of zoning 
discrimination since the accused property owner must either elect 
to have a punishment inflicted against him by the zoning body or a 
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punishment inflicted against him by his neighbors and friends who 
he has, in effect, "turned in". A district court should be 
allowed to consider the circumstances of the discriminatory 
practice in enjoining a city from enforcing penalties against 
other property owners who may have also relied upon the existence 
of the practice when they themselves committed the same 
violation. 
Because of these reasons, therefore, it is respectfully 
requested that this Court review the decision of the Court of 
Appeals, the District Court, and the Board of Adjustment in order 
to correct these inequities. 
DATED this 1st day of May, 1989. 
lps«^ 
J./Tfeuee Reading 
Attorney for Pet i t ioners 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies 
of the foregoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Court 
of Appeals to Bruce R. Baird, Salt Lake City Attorney's Office, 
324 South State, 5th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this 1st 
day of May, 1989. 
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APPENDIX 
BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT HEARING 
May 26, 1987 
LAniDlJ. £\ 
BFFORE THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
FINDINGS AND ORDER, CASE NO, 478-B 
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION: 
This is an appeal by Morris W. Told at 1665 Laird Avenue for a variance 
to legalize an addition to a single-family dwelling, attached carport 
and garage under construction without the required side and rear yards 
in a Residential ,8R-2'e District. 
Elaine Told, Morris Told and J. Bruce Reading, attorney were present, 
Mr. Hafey explained that this same request was before the Board on March 
2, 1987 and was denied. They want to legalize an addition to a single-
family dwelling in the rear, a carport in the side yard and an L-shaped 
garage addition in the rear yard. The garage is attached to the 
addition by the carport. The garage and carport do not have a side yard 
or rear yard, so the house does not have the required side yard on the 
east or rear yard. Mr. Reading explained that he realized that this 
case has been before the Board before, but the reason they decided to 
come before the Board again is they felt that there was an issue which 
was not discussed which should have been. They believe that this 
violation is in place because Mr. Told wanted to enjoy his land as many 
of his neighbors had enjoyed theirs. Mr. Reading explained that in 
researching this case he had come across a case involving a man named 
Karchner who had a run-in with the County Board of Adjustment. The 
request involved a carport alongside his house which was in violation. 
The Board denied the case and so he appealed to the Supreme Court. The 
Supreme Court said where there were six other violations similar to his 
within his neighborhood, it would be unfair not to allow his carport to 
remain. This is the reason the case has again come before the Board. 
In a 3 block radius of the Told home, there were 38 instances which had 
violations similar to the Told's. Mr. Reading presented pictures and 
addresses showing the homes in violation. Mrs. Pace noted that these 
other homes don't have the composite problems which the Told's has. Mr. 
Reading stated that their feeling was that this argument doesn't hold 
water because it is hard to decide when to start to enforce the 
ordinance. The Tolds want the same right to enjoy their property as 
their neighbors. Mr. Reading questioned how severe this violation is. 
Mr. Reading stated that Mr. Told built on an existing garage foundation; 
however, his error was building on the back of his house too close. 
Mrs. Pace pointed out that not getting a building permit was also an 
error. Mr. Nelson also noted that the garage sits on a new foundation 
and footings. Mr. Told explained that the floor was taken out after the 
garage was built. It was noted that the original garage was legal and 
this garage would also be legal by itself. Mr. Reading suggested that 
he was not trying to justify what Mr. Told did. But he feels with this 
situation, where there are many other homes in the area with similar 
violations, selective enforcement is not appropriate. 
Mr. Told explained concerning the permit. At that time, he had water 
pouring into the house and he came to the One Stop Counter and asked 
what he should do and was told to show what was not legal on the plans. 
The reason the garage is on a new foundation and footings is in the 
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process of building on the old one, it fell apart, so he was a victim of 
the previous builder. Mrs, Pace pointed out, however, that the previous 
garage did not have the "LH extension or the same proximity to the 
house. Mr. Told explained that they were in the process of getting a 
permit by way of having the plans drawn. Mr. Told was reminded that 
permits are issued after plans are presented and approved. They had the 
plans just about done when it was enforced on. It was noted that the 
plan which was submitted for the building permit did not show everything 
which is on the property. Mr. Told stated that he was told what to put 
on the plan and this is what he included. Mrs. Told felt that since the 
neighbors did not oppose this construction, it should not be a problem. 
There were no protests. Later in the meeting, the Board discussed the 
various aspects of the case. The Board noted that the Tolds are not 
willing to compromise. The Board also noted the text of the previous 
decision where a variance was granted to legalize the garage and 
addition to the rear of the dwelling subject to conditions. 
From the evidence before it and after further consideration, it is the 
opinion of the Board that the granting of the requested variance would 
be inimical to the best interest of the district and contrary to the 
spirit and intent of the Zoning Ordinance, since the Board could find no 
unusual condition attached to this property which would deprive the 
owner of a substantial property right or use of his property which would 
justify the granting of the requested variance. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the requested variance to legalize an 
addition to a single-family dwelling, attached carport and garage under 
construction without the required side and rear yards be denied. 
This decision is in keeping with the decision on the previous Board Case 
No. 435-B which grants a variance to allow the detached garage in the 
rear yard 4 feet (eave to eave) to the rear of the addition and closer 
than 15 feet to the neighbor's dwelling. The carport is to be removed 
within 30 days of the dating of the Findings and Order. 
Action taken by the Board Of Adjustment at its meeting held May 11, 
1987. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah this 26th day of May, 1987. 
BOARD . ADJUSTMENT FH'ARIN'l 
r 
BEK'RF "W ^ — - \". -JS^lEF" ':-: "" IAFE m r UTAH 
FINDINGS ANl J:a;EP, CASE NO. 435-B 
REPORT OF THF AMISSION: 
This is an appeal oy Morris W. "Told at 1665 Laird Avenue for a variance to 
legalize an addition to a singLe-family dwelling, attached carport and garage 
under construction without tine required side and rear yards in a Residential 
HR-2" District. 
Elaine Told and Morris Told were present- Mr. Hafey explained that this 
structure on Laird Avenue is a single-family dwelling. The Tolds have 
constructed an addition on the rear of this building which, if the addition 
alone were there, would meet the ordinance requirements because it would have 
a 30 foot rear yard and the house has a 9 foot pit is side yard on the west side 
and at least 10 feet or more on the east side. They have constructed an "L" 
shaped garage in the back ••yard (a detached garage can go in a rear yard as 
long as it is 4 feet from the rear of the building) but it is attached to the 
house with a carport which is the reason the dwelling has no side yard and no 
rear yard because the garage is attached to the carport. Mr. Told explained 
that a storm ruined their previous garage and flooded their basement and this 
was the reason they built the new garage. They rebuilt their garage because 
they need security for their cars from vandalism in their neighborhood. Mr. 
Told expressed his feeling that the garage is in keeping with the rest of the 
neighborhood because there are several other homes with garages with attached 
carports similar to theirs. The purpose of the carport is to keep the 
driveway clear of ice and snow. Mrs. Told explained that there are several 
residences around their home whi ch have similar situations to theirs ^i\-\ a 
garage and carport. 
There were no protests. Later in the meeting,, the Board discussed the various 
aspects of the case. It was noted that the carport is about a foot from the 
east property line and the garage is about 6 inches from the east property 
line. The Board was also concerned about access, to the rear yard if there 
were a fire with so little space between the buildings and the property line 
on the east. .Mr. Told said that there is good access on the West side. It 
was also noted that when the "Tolds came in to get a permit for the addition to 
the rear of the dwelling, the plan did not show the garage and the attached 
carport which are already built. The plan the permit was issued on indicated 
the addition .met all the ordinance requirements. It 'was also noted that the 
application for a variance to legalize the building as built was filed pr-or 
to the buildino nermit- fnr t-hp addition being issued. 
From the evid* • -;re it and alter further consideration, it is the opinion 
of the Board . •- trie granting of the requested variance to legalize an 
addition to ^ -,ngle-family dwelling, attached carport and garage under 
construction without the required side and rear yards would be inimical to the 
'best interest of the district and contrary to the spirit and intent of the 
Zoning Ordinance, since the Board could find no unusual condition attached to 
this property which, would deprive the owner of a substantial property right or 
use of his property which would justi fy the granting of the requested 
vari ance. 
Findings and Order 
Case No. 435-B 
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the requested variance be denied. However, it is 
also ordered that a variance to allow the detached garage in the rear yard 4 
feet (eave to eave) to the rear of the addition and closer than 15 feet to the 
neighbor's dwelling and that the carport be removed within 30 days of the 
dating of these Findings and Order. 
THE FAILURE OF THE APPLICANT TO ABIDE BY THE CONDITIONS OF THIS VARIANCE SHALL 
CAUSE IT TO BECOME NULL AND VOID, WHICH IN EFFECT IS THE SAME AS THE VARIANCE 
HAVING BEEN DENIED. 
Action taken by the Board of Adjustment at its meeting held March 2, 1987. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah this 16th day of March, 1987. 
Aaring Secretary 
v / Chairman ^J J J £ ^ / 
P E T I T I O N i-'OF B E L I E F OF UQi\RD 
'• , • 'US'ITENTS ORDF.:R 
7 BRUCE READING, #2700 
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
261 East 300 South, Second Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone; (801) 531-7870 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUK'J" Fill! iSAL/l L . A K I : i I ,," IIIIMII Il i1' 
STATE OF UTAH . 
MORRIS W. TOLD and ELAINE : PETITION FOR RELIEF OF BOARD 
TOLD, OF ADJUSTMENTS ORDER IN CASE 
NUMBER 478-B 
Plaintiff, 
vs. : 
SALT LAKE CITY BOARD OF Civil No, 
ADJUSTMENTS, 
Defendant. i Judge 
COME NOW the plaintiffs and allege and petition the 
above-en I i I 1 i il  I nui I I Uiw : 
1 linn plaintiffs are th« owners of a residence 
1 . 1 1 IM 11 ii 1 i 1 1 1 11 * M i,. j 111 !•.
 ( >• H I - i M * ke P i t y " t a h 
2 II • i i u a i i t f < Ill .ih I/UILRI hnn I dill mil '„ ) II "j il'i I h e 
| j I <i i n t i f f s h a v i " h e e n a g g r i e v e d Ihy t h e d e c i s i o n b y t h e B o a r d n l 
Ad j ii'it.iMiM in I I il i I illt'i I s in in mi 11 I di I  in'1! I IN in I I n . i s 1 ' i i h i l i i l in, II 
iiiadle b y r e f e r PII i i . i (hi i f h e r e o f . 
3 'I h e p l a i n t i f f s p e t i t i o n t h e d e n i a l o f a v a r i a n c e t o 
l e g a l i z e CJIIIII HI Ilillli I i o n I n J . i n g l e .1. ami I v dwii! Il II, iiuiiy , <i I LcK.heil 
c a r p o r t a n d <|i mi |i» based upon the Board of Adjustments caprice 
ani l ,Hi? lu l l ra r 1 i i fw-i i III I  ln> f i i l I o\ \ i nt i i r n n < m m miis i 
a. There is nothing in the findings that 
objectively would indicate why the granting of the requested 
variance would be inimical to the best interest of the district 
and contrary to the spirit and intent of the zoning ordinance. 
b. There is nothing in the findings that 
objectively would indicate that the Board of Adjustments 
considered the fact that the plaintiffs would be deprived of 
privileges possessed by other property owners in the same 
district. 
4. The plaintiffs petition the denial of the above 
variance based upon the Board of Adjustments discriminatory 
manner in enforcing the zoning ordinance in that there are at 
least thirty-eight (38) known violations of a similar nature in 
the vicinity. In fact, these violations are within three city 
blocks of plaintiffs1 property. 
WHEREFORE, the plaintiffs pray that the order denying 
the invariance be reversed and the variance be granted. 
DATED this /*~day of June, 1987. 
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING 
Plaintiff's address: 
1665 Laird Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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AFFIDAVIT OF 
MERRTL'. " T. )N 
BRUCE R. BAIRD, #0176 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorney for Defendant 
324 South State Street, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)535-7788 
IN THE THIRD Jl " "' '• * ' ! " I . ^ K T ™v ">T 'V A NID FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, ST A l'E OF UTAH 
MORRIS W TOLD and Iil MNLi, ] 
TOLD, .] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
SALT LAKE CTTY BOARD OF, ] 
ADJUSTMENTS, ] 
Defendant ] 
i AFFIDAVIT OF 
1 MERRILL L. NELSON 
I Civil No C8-U450 
I Judge Richard H. Moffat 
i, 
STATE OF I IT A H • ) 
) ss. 
County of Salt L .^ ,. ) 
Merrill I Ison, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says as follows* 
Department 
2. In tha* ** n " '*' ,rt ^ familiar with,, the zoning enforcement 
policies :)f ^ . .„...". 
. 3, The Ti4(S pi^;)n:\ i: ' ^ La;:J Avenue in Salt Lake City is in a 
Residential "R-2" — 
4. The Lii> 3 LUILLU^ ci.iv)rcement department usually becomes aware of 
zoning violation n ,nre: n when plans are submitte*.:. tb» WHO neighbors 
compla iri; . . - i ' ie ii ig , i * • - - r : >t 
in compliance with zoning. 
5. The City's resources are not sufficient to hire enough building inspectors 
to catch every violation before it is completed, and thus, the City relies heavily on being 
informed of violations by citizens. This is especially true where the illegal construction 
is done without a permit. 
6. The Tolds' garage at 1665 Laird Avenue was constructed without a 
building permit. 
7. The Tolds obtained a building permit for a two-story addition to their 
house by submitting plans to the Building Department which failed to show the garage 
which they had previously constructed without a permit. 
8. The Tolds built the carport which is the subject of this complaint without a 
building permit 
9. The Tolds' property and structures at 1665 Laird Avenue violate the 
sideyard setback requirements of Section 51-14-3, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City. 
by the carport being attached to the garage and the house. 
10. After constructing the three improper structures, the Tolds sought a 
legalization variance from the Board of Adjustment which was initially denied on March 
2,1987. 
11. Plaintiffs again petitioned the Board of Adjustment for legalization, this 
time relying on Salt Lake County v. Kartchner. 552 P.2d 136 (Utah 1976), and presented 
a list of allegedly similar violations near the plaintiffs' property. (See Exhibit A attached 
to this Affidavit) 
12. The City's Building and Housing Department investigated all of the 
alleged violations and determined that twenty-one of the addresses did not have any 
violations because Section 51-13-1, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, allowed a 
detached accessory building properly located in the rear yard. 
13-.- Of the twenty-one remaining addresses on the Told list, two were simple 
duplications (i.e., the exact same address listed twice). 
~r
 *:he remaining nineteen addresses with similar 
v io Lat ; ?rr"* ^sea r :h shewed ^ a t f--ur ^ f *'*-• ri-1^  ••-ss.-»- nad 
rece;vea p - . . daances trom tne boar 3 or Adjustment -and 
one address was found to have a non-conforming use* 
: t i-L . ^ t . - «- • - 3 * - a r :1
 ; • -
caused notices LO oe served >M fuuefeen properties w,:; 
violat ions. 
•-.li I " I 'debt ei ii »u L'Liiieiil notices, Liu cu ijl 
the properties immediately complied by removing tine illegal 
structures. 
Jil "I Ei gl: 11 : • :i)f tne properties applied for variances, all 
of which have been denied. 
the iLiega, structure within •, inety days, wnile the other 
two have b<=*en put ~ administrative ho - 1 while *~K^ n • *" 
. < _ : . . . to 
take m t o -jnsideraujcn tr.*-* ngth -t . TV; -^r w n,;h * • .-
illeo^ c^iaiiiufi a.' - existed "" " • 4 fin 
> > . . ie property (i . e., ;i L the viola Ling structure was 
created ^ a prior owner). 
JL:? . xne tnree pre * 
apply for a variance an. ~<~.. , « -^i...*. i - ^ the Mr., 
Prosecutor :'zi ruture ^-t* action. 
DATED this / P ^ day of September, 1987. 
Zoning Official 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me t h i s ^ S r ^ d a y of 
September*; ;i98T.:.:*. ... 
*>t 
%vc * NOTARY PUBLIC, residing in 
%':>\v~ ",-•.... S a l t L a k e County, Utah 
BRB: cc li%v5" '-
-A-
AFFIDAVIT ™? 
MORRIS W. ' • 
J. BRUCE REAL^.,.. #2700 
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
261 East 300 South, Second r. 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
Telephone i • . i b 3 ] - 7 tiV L 
IN T'HF ' *-^  * "• TSTRICT COUP'ri FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
MORRIS W I-'-.: cir.i F: AiNE : AFFIDAVIT OF MURK ! S A' 
TOLD 
Plaintiffs, 
SALT LAKE CIT'Y BOARD 01 ' Civil No. CH'»4Ubl.l 
ADJUSTMENTS, 
Defendant. : Ji ldge Richard H. Moffat: 
STATE Ot ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF c* ' LAKE I 
>., . * s W , "T"u 11J lb*,'11\\.\ i 11 st (ju I.y !;.» - urn, d^ pubK',11 iiii I 
states as follows: 
1 ' * • • ? > - * « »* i d i i u X dill a 
~ i d e r t of odi^ bake- w u u l • <.» 
2 l t a ^ t p e r s o n a l knowledge ^1 "_ -. f a d s t e s t i f i e d 
3 jm>»»-*r -»* 1 aopr o x i r n a t e l y n i n e t y p e r c e n t of 
^ - "Ti--; from ^i^hhor'hr—rl 
4 r a o u u t Mai. .. ' . . .L t ; r ; ane 
c o n v e r s a t i o n whic l . _ . . ^ j .
 rtj.Lh Mark Hafey , an emplnyee ; .*• trie 3a. t 
Lake City Board of Adjustments, regarding a possible appeal of 
the Board's denial of a variance. 
5. During that conversation we discussed the 
possibility of presenting a list of other potential violators to 
the Board. 
6. I expressed to Mr. Hafey my concern that if I 
turned a list over to the Board, that list might be used to go 
after those people and that my name would be given as a source. 
7. During our telephone conversation Mark Hafey 
promised me that he would not reveal my name. 
8. I relied on Mr. Hafey's promise and presented a 
list of other possible violations to the Board. 
9. On or about July 15, 1987, Mr. Hafey informed me 
that he had given my name to one of those individuals on the 
list. 
10. I can no longer rely on Mr. Hafey's promise 
because my business will be damaged if my neighbors learn that I 
gave their addresses to the Board as possible violators of the 
ordinance. 
The foregoing facts are within my personal knowledge, 
and if called as a witness, I could and would testify to those 
facts. 
2 
£ DATED and executed this C^ day of August, 1987. 
fr<<#<^ 
Morr i s W. Told T 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o be fo r e me t h i s ^ T Z ^ a y of 
J , 1987, 7^ 
My Commission Expires: 
t^ JOTAR^  
1^3 (j^LsijJLe^ 
)TARY PUBL: 
Residing at: 
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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
JAN 11 1903 
BRUCE R. BAIRD, #0176 H. Duon Hinaip, cter!« 3 : o .-,.,. C0lj., 
Assistant City Attorney By _ fx (K ]f<'ff^)n/\ 
Attorney for Defendant \i>->utvt:'or* 
324 South State Street, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (81) 535-7788 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MORRIS W. TOLD 
TOLD, 
VS. 
SALT LAKE CITY 
ADJUSTMENT, 
and ELAINE ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
BOARD OF ] 
Defendant. 
\ ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
1 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1 Civil No. C87-4050 
) Judge Richard H. Moffat 
This matter having come before the Honorable Judge 
Richard H, Moffat at 9:00 a.m. on Friday, October 23, 1987, 
pursuant to cross-motions for summary judgment filed by the 
plaintiffs and the defendant, and the plaintiffs having been 
represented by J. Bruce Reading, Morgan, Scalley & Reading, 
and defendant having been represented by Bruce R. Baird, 
Assistant Salt Lake City Attorney; and the Court having 
reviewed the file in the matter, the Findings of the Board 
of Adjustment, and having received, for good cause shown on 
motion, the plaintiffs' Answers to the defendant's 
Interrogatories, and having heard the arguments of counsel, 
the Court hereby enters the following: 
Undisputed Material Facts: 
1. The Tolds own a residence at 1665 Laird Avenue in 
Salt Lake City. 
2. The Tolds1 property is zoned Residential "R-2" and 
the standards for construction are set by Salt Lake City 
Ordinance Section 51-14-1, et seq. 
3. The City's zoning enforcement usually becomes 
aware of zoning violations in three ways: (a) when plans 
are submitted; (b) when neighbors complain; and (c) 
occasionally by a zoning inspector viewing a construction 
activity not in compliance with the zoning. 
4. The City's resources are not sufficient to hire 
enough building inspectors to catch every violation before 
it is completed, and thus, the City relies heavily on being 
informed of violations by citizens. This is especially true 
where the illegal construction is done without a permit. 
5. The Tolds1 garage at 1665 Laird Avenue was 
constructed without a building permit. 
6. The Tolds obtained a building permit for a two-
story addition to their house by submitting plans to the 
Building Department which failed to show the garage which 
they had previously constructed without a permit. 
7. The Tolds built the carport which is the subject 
of this complaint without a building permit. 
8. The Tolds1 property and structures at 1665 Laird 
Avenue violate the sideyard setback requirements of Section 
51-14-3, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, by the 
carport beinq attached to the aaraae and the house. 
9. After constructing the three improper structures, 
the Tolds sought a legalization variance from the Board of 
Adjustment which was initially denied on March 1, 1987. 
10. Apparently after seeking advice of counsel, 
plaintiffs again petitioned the Board of Adjustment for 
legalization, this time relying on Salt Lake County v. 
Kartchner, 552 P.2d 136 (Utah 1976), and presented a list of 
allegedly similar violations near the plaintiffs1 property. 
(See Findings and Order, Case No. 478-B, submitted as 
Exhibit A with the plaintiffs' complaint ("Findings").) The 
Board again denied the variance, holding: 
From the evidence before it and after further 
consideration, it is the opinion of the Board that 
the granting of the requested variance would be 
inimical to the best interest of the district and 
contrary to the spirit and intent of the Zoning 
Ordinance, since the Board could find no unusual 
condition attached to this property which would 
deprive the owner of a substantial property right 
or use of his property which would justify the 
granting of the requested variance. (Findings, 
p.2.) 
11. In support of the Kartchner defense, the Tolds 
submitted a list and photographs of other homes within the 
Told area which were allegedly in violation. 
12. The City's Building and Housing Department 
investigated all of the alleged violations and determined 
that twenty-one of the addresses did not have any violations 
because Section 51-13-1, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake 
City, allowed a detached accessory building properly located 
in the rear yard. 
13. Of the twenty-one remaining addresses on the Told 
list, two were simple duplications. 
14. Of the remaining nineteen addresses with similar 
violations, research showed that four of the addresses had 
received prior variances form the Board of Adjustment and 
one address was found to have a non-conforming use which had 
been in existence prior to 1927. 
15. After completion of the research, the City caused 
notices to be served on fourteen properties with violations. 
16. As a result of these enforcement notices, three of 
the properties immediately complied by removing the illegal 
structures. 
17. Eight of the properties applied for variances, all 
of which have been denied. 
18. Of these eight, six have been ordered to remove 
the illegal structure within ninety days, while the other 
two have been put on administrative hold while the City 
Council considers whether the ordinance should be amended to 
take into consideration the length of time for which the 
illegal condition has existed and the innocent nature of the 
owner of the property (i.e., if the violating structure was 
created by a prior owner). 
19. The three properties which did not even bother to 
apply for a variance are being turned over to the City 
Prosecutor for future legal action. 
From the foregoing undisputed facts, the Court enters 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. It is not within the province of the trial court 
to review the rationale of the Board of Adjustment, the 
policy grounds on which the Board's decision was based, nor 
for the Court to substitute its judgment for that of the 
Board where the record discloses a reasonable basis for the 
Board's decision. Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment of Salt 
Lake City, 685 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1984). 
2. The burden on the petitioners, recognizing that 
each piece of property is unique, is to show that the 
property itself contains some special circumstance that 
relates to the hardship complained of and that granting a 
variance to take this into account would not substantially 
affect the zoning plan. Xanthos, supra, at 1036. 
3. The record of the Board of Adjustment proceedings 
and plaintiffs' Answers to defendant's Interrogatories fail 
to disclose any evidence which would even suggest that the 
Board's finding of lack of special circumstances and absence 
of hardship was arbitrary and capricious. 
4. The mere fact that other similar violations exist 
within the same neighborhood or that some of the similar 
violations may have been granted variances in the past does 
not render the Board's decision arbitrary and capricious. 
5. Further, the City's immediate enforcement upon 
notification of these other alleged violations takes this 
case out from under the decision in Salt Lake County v. 
Kartchner, 552 P.2d 136 (Utah 1976), in that the City did 
not ignore the alleged inconsistency in its enforcement and, 
instead, immediately brought all possible actions to 
maintain a consistent enforcement. 
6. Further, even if the facts of this case were 
within Kartchner, plaintiffs are not entitled to rely on 
Kartchner because: 
To invoke the doctrine [of equitable estoppel] the 
[city] must have committed an act or omission upon 
which the [petitioner] could rely in good faith in 
making substantial changes in position or 
incurring extensive expenses. The action upon 
which the developer claims reliance must be of a 
clear, definite and affirmative nature. If the 
claim be based on omission of the local zoning 
authority, omission means a negligent or culpable 
omission where the party failing to act was under 
a duty to do so. Silence or inaction will not 
operate to work in estoppel. Finally, and most 
importantly, the landowner has a duty to inquire 
and confer with the local zoning authority 
regarding the uses of the property that would be 
permitted. Utah County v. Young, 615 P.2d 1265, 
1267-68 (Utah 1980). 
"Finally, estoppel may not be used as a defense by a 
person who has acted in bad faith, fraudulently or with 
knowledge." Xanthos, supra, at 1038. (Footnote omitted.) 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, the Court enters the following Order Granting Summary 
Judgment for defendants: 
ORDER 
There being no genuine dispute as to any Material fact 
and the defendant being entitled to Judgment a* a setter of 
law, the Court hereby grants nummary jodgaant to the 
defendant disalsslng the action of the plaintiffs tilth 
prejudice, the plaintiffs taking nothing thereby and 
upholding the Findings, Conclusions and Order of the Board 
of Adjustment. Pursuant to a Stipulation entered in open 
court between the plaintiffs and the defendant, the 
plaintiffs will not be required to immediately comply with 
the Order of the Board to remedy the zoning violations 
pending the timely filing of an appeal by the plaintiffs and 
the posting of a cash bond in an amount and form reasonably 
satisfactory to the defendant to insure that the Order of 
the Board upheld by this Court is complied with immediately 
upon the determination of any appeal* 
MADE AND ENTERED this day of 
1987. 
Approved as to form: 
Judge 
ATTEST 
3
* -^dEpuV/^erK 
J. Bruce Reading, Attorney 
for Plaintiffs 
BRB:pp 
<fU Afectr** jrr fk^ Oder; sf*r/?,m/L 
fjuS* Z4- **>W ~* ^ ' ^ ^ hs l*y -ex/SsrS. 
ORDER 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
— — O O O O O - — 
Morris W. Told and Elaine Told# 
Plaintiffs and Appellants/ 
V. 
Salt Lake City Board of 
Adjustments, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Before Judges Bench, Garff and Dee, Senior Judge sitting 
by special assignment (On Rule 31 Hearing). 
This matter is before the court pursuant to Rule 31, 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the judgment of the 
district court is affirmed. 
DATED this Z^L-day of February, 1989. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
ORDER 
Case No. 880106-CA 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on 24, February 1989 I mailed a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER by depositing the same with 
the United States Mail, postage prepaid to the following: 
J. Bruce Reading 
Morgan, Scalley & Reading 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellants 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Roger F. Cutler 
Salt Lake City Attorney 
Bruce R. Baird 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorney for Defendant and Respondent 
324 South State Street, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
DATED this 24th day of February, 1989. 
Cathleen Flvnn u 
By 
Kathleen Flynn 
Case Management Clerk 
